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THE USE OF CRIMINAL LAW AS A STANDARD OF CIVIL
RESPONSIBILITY IN INDIANA
CLEON H. FOUSTt
One intriguing aspect of the day to day application of legal prin-
ciples to litigated cases is the persistent search for techniques which will
produce specific and accurate answers to liability problems. If a-more
or less fixed measuring device can be contrived which applied to varying
fact situations will produce reliable answers, the uncertainty of legal. re-
sponsibility is removed that much. Whether certainty in law is an un-
mixed boon is debatable but certainly it may be a comfortable boon for at
least one party to each dispute. One of the many such techniques is the
use of a safety regulation with a criminal penalty attached either to sug-
gest or to mandate the answer to one question in a civil case: Was de-
fendant (or plaintiff) negligent? This article will deal with the develop-
ment of the statutory negligence formula in Indiana and an examination
of its present status.1
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND
A. Negligence. It is undoubtedly true that the Anglo-American law
of negligence, if not a product, was at least a contemporary of the indus-
trial revolution.2 With "the machine" providing its general impetus, the
two-stage propulsions which pushed negligence into the position of the
champion liability producer of the later 19th and 20th centuries were ap-
parently provided by two methods of motive power, the steam engine and
the gasoline engine.
It is not extraordinary that the first reported Indiana case utilizing
unmistakable negligence terminology such as the prudent man, foresight
and degree of probability of injury, occurred in 1827.' The date accords
generally with the earliest recognition of negligence as a basis of civil
responsibility in other Anglo-American jurisdictions.4 It is somewhat
unexpected that this, the first Indiana case speaking in terms of care and
t Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law, Indianapolis, Indiana.
1. The development of safety regulations and their effect upon civil liability should
be typical in Indiana because that state has passed through the dominantly agricultural
phase and is now preponderately industrial, and because it has always possessed many
transportation facilities due to geographical location.
2. 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 752 (1956). In Indiana industrialization lagged be-
hind the East. There was no important industrialization until the 1850's. 2 BARNHARr
& CARMONY, INDIANA FROM FRONTIER TO INDUSTRIAL COMMONWEALTH 226 (1954).
3. Durham v. Musselman, 2 Blackf. 96 (Ind. 1827).
4. PROSSER, TORTS 117 (2d ed. 1955).
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diligence involved neither a machine nor personal injury but injury by
dogs to a trespassing horse. Likewise the next case 5 -procedurally re-
solved-involved property damage. With negligence established as a
basis of responsibility, the Indiana court soon settled two pleading prob-
lems: first, that trespass on the case was a proper action for a direct but
unintentional injury,6 and second, that plaintiff must allege his own free-
dom from negligence in actions on the case for negligence.7
In the hands of one Wright, who apparently had a penchant for
charging his boat about the waters of the Ohio under a full head of steam,
the steam engine began to show its liability potential.' In 1853 the lo-
comotive appeared in the reports almost simultaneously answerable for
both property damage and personal injury.' "Negligence" as a digest
heading first appeared in the Indiana Supreme Court Reports in 1851.10
However, the "reasonable man" standard was not officially enunciated
until 1861."
B. Statutory negligence. The origin of statutory negligence is not
dear. In 1285 the Statute of Westminister I112 provided an action on
the case to all aggrieved by the neglect of any duty created by that stat-
ute. 8 In 1762, Comyn's Digest enlarged upon this foundation:
So in every Case where a Statute enacts, or prohibits a Thing
for the Benefit of a Person, he shall have a Remedy upon the
same Statute for the Thing enacted for his Advantage, or for
5. Amick v. O'Hara, 6 Blackf. 258 (Ind. 1842).
6. Schuer v. Vender, 7 Blackf. 342 (Ind. 1845). This date corresponds roughly
with the leading American case of Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. 292 (1850) which estab-
lished the corollary that direct injury was no longer the touchstone of liability. If
unintentional, fault had to be proved.
7. Mount Vernon v. Dusochett, 2 Ind. 586 (1851).
8. Wright v. Gaff, 6 Ind. 416 (1855) ; Wright v. Brown, 4 Ind. 95 (1853).
9. Gillenwater v. Indianapolis and Madison R. R., 5 Ind. 339 (1854) (first Indi-
ana case allowing recovery for negligently produced personal injury, although the action
was in-trespass) ; Shelbyville Lateral Branch R. R. v. Lewark, 4 Ind. 471 (1853) (prop-
erty damage). The fact that the State of Indiana had invested about a million and a
half in the Madison railroad line made no difference in establishing the standard of
care. The court said the duty of the carrier was that bf utmhost care. See ESARY, IN-
TERNAL IMPROVEMENTS IN EARLY INDIANA 115-116 (Ind. Hist. Soc., No. V, 1912). It
is interesting to note that in 1845 there were only 30 miles of railroad in Indiana. But
eight years later, by the time of the Gillenwater case, there were 1209 miles. The rail-
road from Madison to Indianapolis which appears in that case was first in the state.
The Shelbyville Lateral Branch Line was probably a branch of the main road to Madi-
son. 2 BARNHART & CARmONY, op. cit. supra n. 2 at 29.
10. The heading began to appear in the English abridgements in 1843. Winfield,
History of Negligence, 42 L.Q. REv. 184, 195 (1926).
11. Howe v. Young, 16 Ind. 312 (1861).
12. 13 Edw. 1, Stat. 1, c. 50 (repealed) ; See 2 HOLDSWoRTH'S HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 300 (1936).
13. At least Lord Campbell so interpreted it in Couch v. Steel, 3 E. & B. 402, 118
Eng. Rep. 1193 (Q.B. 1854).
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the Recbmpence of a Wrong done to him contrary to the said
Law. Per Holt, MIod. Ca. 26.7."4
Both of these authorities antidate negligence as a source of responsibility.
In 1854 the precedent establishing English case of Couch v. Steel" relied
upon these two authorities in imposing civil responsibility for injury re-
sulting from a violation of a statute. This apparently was the origin
of a prolific species of liability the main branch of which is now statu-
tory negligence.16 In short, the original bloodline of statutory negli-
gence seems not to have been negligence at all. It was strict liability based
upon the violation of a statute. Responsibility automatically followed
the violation with the emphasis upon cause rather than the defendant's
fault. This is a possible explanation of the negligence per se formula.
As cases of statutory responsibility were, in terms, assimilated into the
law of negligence, liability for breach of the statute could remain strict
by treating the breach as negligence as a matter of law. Results con-
sistent with the earlier cases were thus achieved and furthermore, the
formula had one great advantage-it provided a quick answer to the
responsibility inquiry.
If it can be said that the first English case of statutory negligence
appeared in 1854, then the appearance of the same formula for responsi-
bility followed closely thereafter in this country. In 1865 the New York
court, citing no authority, said one violating a speed ordinance was neces-
sarily negligent in the eyes of the law." But, as in England, the real
14. 1 COmYNS, DIGEST OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND 248 (1762).
15. 3 E. & B. 402, 118 Eng. Rep. 1193 (Q.B. 1854).
16. E.g., Groves v. Winborn [1898] 2 Q.B. 402; Gorris v. Scott L. R. 9 Exch. 125
(1874). The later English cases consistently followed the formula laid down in Couch
v. Steel, viz., that if the statute imposed a duty redounding to the benefit of a particular
class of the public anyone injured by the breach of duty might bring an action upon the
statute. While the results were thus consistent courts were apparently not very sure
of the rationale. In addition to the reasons for liability adduced in Couch v. Steel, Baron
Pollock, who participated in the decision of Gorris v. Scott, took the position in his
book on Torts (p. 17, Am. ed. 1887) that failure to perform a statutory duty was
"generally equivalent to an act done with intent to cause wrongful injury." Also fre-
quently encountered as in Groves v. Winborn, (pp. 410, 418) is the language of "ab-
solute" and "unqualified" duties which enabled the courts to obviate excuses for breach
of the statute. See also, I ADDISON, TORTS 65 (1876) ; SALMOND, TORTS § 159 (1907) ;
WINFIELD, TORTS § 38 (4th ed. 1948); Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27
HARv. L. REV. 317 (1914). Nor should the similarity between the formula for recovery
in these cases and that for private recovery for injuries caused by a public nuisance be
overlooked. See Thayer, op. cit. supra at 326. In later English cases involving breaches
of statutory duties the solution is more frequently in terms of negligence. E.g., Loch-
gelly Iron & Coal Co. v. M'Mullan [1934] A. C. 1 (1933). Compare Groves v. Win-
born, supra. See SAL.MOND, TORTS §§ 173-75 (11th ed. 1953) ; 2 STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF
LEGAL LIABILITY 172 (1906).
17. Jetter v. New York & Harlem R. R., 2 Abb. App. Dec. 458, 464 (N.Y. 1865).
"[E]very person while violating an express statute is a wrong-doer, and, as such, is ex
nwcessitate negligent in the eye of the law, and every innocent party whose person is
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rationale of responsibility remained uncertain. In 1913 Professor Thayer
began his classic discussion of Public Wrong and Private Action 8 with
the inquiry, "When does the violation of a criminal statute or ordinance
make the wrongdoer civilly responsible ?" On this question, he said, "the
law is in some confusion." It is apliarent that even then the confusion
pertained not so much to what criminal regulations affected civil lia-
bility as it did to the weight to be given to a breach of a regulation-
whether, as Professor Thayer said, the breach was "negligence per se,"
"prima facie evidence of negligence" or only "evidence of negligence."
The latter divergence of opinion remains largely unresolved. The
American Law Institute suggested in 1934 that if the criminal regula-
tion were a safety regulation, i.e., designed to protect a class of people
from certain hazards, its violation should produce civil liability to those
who were members of the class and whose injuries resulted from the
hazard.'" This result assumes, of course, that a causal relationship exists
between the violation and the harm and that there are no defenses of con-
tributory fault.2" While, generally speaking, all authorities would agree
concerning the necessity of a causal relationship and the applicability of
the latter defenses, not all would agree with the restatement position con-
cerning the weight to be given the violation of a safety regulation. Prob-
ably the majority of the courts in this country treat the violation as negli-
gence. per se."
II. INDIANA CASES ON STATUTORY NEGLIGENCE
The first Indiana case of statutory negligence2 like the first New
York case involved a speed ordinance and contained no authority but, un-
like the New York pronouncement, said the ordinance was admissable
rather than conclusive on the question of negligence. This view by the
Indiana court seemed to treat a statute or ordinance, like evidence of cus-
tom, as circumstantial evidence of negligence. It was, however, short
lived. In 1880 the leading Indiana case of Pennsylvania Company v.
Hensil,2 citing no cases, held, that failure to perform a duty imposed by
injured by the act which constitutes the violation of the statute is entitled to a civil rem-
edy for such injury notwithstanding any redress the public may also have."
18. 27 HARv. L. Rtv. 317 (1914).
19. 2 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 286 (1934); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 286
(TENT. DRAFT No. 4, 1959).
20. 2 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 286 Comment D (1934); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
TORTS §§ 288A, 288B (TENT. DRAFT No. 4, 1959).
21. 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 17.6 (1956) ; PROSSER, TORTS § 34 (2d ed. 1955).
22. Madison & I. R. R. v. Taffe, 37 Ind. 361 (1871).
23. 70 Ind. 569, 574 (1880). This result was said to coincide with the "over-
whelming" weight of authority citing only THOMPSON, NEGLIGENCE, and SHERMAN &
REDFIELD, NEGLIGENCE.
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a statute was negligence per se "and entitles an injured party to recover,
provided the failure was a proximate cause of the injury." Why at that
time the court chose to ignore the only previous Indiana authority can
only be pondered. The assurance with which the Indiana court an-
nounced the negligence per se foimula was belied by the then existing
authorities. There was no clear weight of American authority. 4 Never-
theless, Indiana became one of the pioneers in the application of the strict
doctrine that breach of a penal safety regulation compels civil liability as
a matter of law.2"
Shortly after the turn of the century Indiana civil cases involving
violations of criminal statutes had established an analytical pattern con-
sistent with other states as follows:
a. If the statute violated specifically provided for civil recovery by
an injured party, liability followed breach as a matter of law but the
tendency of the courts in many instances was to cast the results in these
cases in the statutory negligence framework."
b. Even if no civil recovery was specified, the breach of a criminal
law was pertinent on the issue of negligence if it appeared the enactment
was primarily a safety regulation designed (1) to protect a class of peo-
ple of whom plaintiff was a member and (2) to prevent the type of in-
jury which had occurred in the case presented." The latter determina-
tiont were then and are now ones of law. It makes little difference
whether the issue is negligence or contributory negligence since in either
event the extraction of a legal duty from the safety regulation is resolved
by the same considerations.28
24. SHERMAN & REDFIELD, NEGLIGENCE 484 (1869); SMITH, NEGLIGENCE 29 (2nd
Am. ed. 1896). The arrangement of the treatises of this time is functional; e.g., lia-
bility of employers, railways etc., rather than analytical.
25. 1 THouPsoN, NEGLIGENCE § 419, at 402 (2nd ed. 1901).
26. See e.g, Cincinnati W. & M. Ry. v. Hiltzhauer, 99 Ind. 486 (1884); Eggeling
v. Chicago R. I. & P. Ry., 119 Neb. 229, 228 N.W. 361 (1929) ; Ives v. South Buffalo
Ry., 200 N.Y. 271, 298, 94 N.E. 431, 441 (1911). See 2 HARPER & JAMES, ToRTs 992(1956) ; Note, 31 NEB. L. REv. 474, 481 (1952).
27. Hile v. Chicago I. & L. R. R., 188 Ind. 130, 122 N.E. 321 (1919) ; Terre Haute
& I. R. R. v. Brunker, 128 Ind. 542, 26 N.E. 178 (1891); King v. Laycock Power
House Co., 46 Ind. App. 420, 92 N.E. 741 (1910) ; Baltimore & 0. S'W. Ry. v. Bradford,
20 Ind. App. 348, 49 N.E. 388 (1898). JAGGARD, ToRTs § 263 (1895). The writer has
eliminated for the purpose of this discussion those statutes which have been construed
to impose strict liability such as Child Labor Statutes, Repczynsld v. Mikulak, 93 Ind.
App. 491, 157 N.E. 464 (1931); delivery of possession of a motor vehicle to certain
under age drivers, Smith v. Thomas, 126 Ind. App. 59, 130 N.E.2d 85 (1955) and adul-
teration of foods and drugs, Meyer v. Greenwood, 125 Ind. App. 288, 124 N.E.2d 870(1955).
28. Heiny, Adm'rx. v. Pennsylvania R. R., 221 Ind. 367, 47 N.E.2d 145 (1943);
2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 1228 (1956); Harper, Development of the Law of Torts
in Indiana, 21 IND. L. J. 447, 462 (1946).
While acknowledging the rule, in many cases the court rescues the plaintiff on the
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Once the court has decided that the regulation was designed to pro-
tect the plaintiff from the kind of injury which occurred there still re-
mains the question of the optimum effect to be given to the violation;
i.e., whether it is persuasive or presumptive or conclusive of negligence.
Typically, as in the Hemil case, this inquiry into the procedurual effect of
the violation received very little consideration in the early cases. Thus,
While the fundamentals of civil duty imposed by a safety regulation had
been laid down at the turn of the century, analysis of statutory negli-
gence was admittedly incomplete.
The Indiana cases dealing with statutory negligence are in many
instances unconnected by citation. However, four major chains of
authorities are recognizable. They will be discussed briefly in the follow-
ifig paragraphs.
A. The locomotive signal cases. Two years after the pronounce-
ment in the Hensil case that the breach of an ordinance generated respon-
sibility as a matter of law there began a long series of cases under an
1879 act regulating locomotive signals at street and highway intersec-
tions.2" Section 2 of the act specifically provided for a civil recovery by
"any person . . . who may be injured" by failure or neglect to comply
with the signal requirements. The statutory imposition of civil re-
sponsibility was clear and unambiguous. Liability should have followed
from (1) a breach of the statute which (2) caused plaintiff's injury.
Whether by undue emphasis on the term "neglect" in the statute, by re-
sort subconsciously to a familiar legal technique or by a conscious desire
to soften the blow upon the railway enterprise, the Indiana court led by
Judge Elliott" promptly assimilated Section 2 into the negligence com-
plex. 1 So long as Indiana adhered to the rule that breach of a safety
regulation was negligence as a matter of law, Judge Elliott's interpreta-
tion did not affect the finding of primary liability. But his interpreta-
proximate cause issue. E.g., Beckstein v. Sayler, Adm'r., 93 Ind. App. 686, 179 N.E.
581 (1931) ; Schindler v. Kappler, 77 Ind. App. 385, 133 N.E. 519 (1921) ; Indianapolis
Traction Co. v. Senour, Adm'x., 71 Ind. App. 10, 122 N.E. 772 (1919). Compare Opple
v. Ray, 208 Ind. 450, 195 N.E. 81 (1935).
29. Ind. Acts 1879, Ch. 77, at 173.
30. In the same year in a case involving another statute, Judge Elliott had sug-
gested there might be an excuse for violation of the safety regulation. Binford v.
Johnston, 82 Ind. 426, 434 (1882).
31. Cincinnati W. & M. Ry. v. Hiltzhauer, 99 Ind. 486 (1884). The Indiana court
engaged in the same assimilative process under two separate statutes granting civil re-
coveries for injuries "occasioned by violations" of mining safety acts. Ind. Acts 1891,
Ch. 49, § 13; Ind. Acts 1905, Ch. 50 § 27; Davis Coal Co. v. Polland, 158 Ind. 607, 62
N.E. 492 (1902); Princeton Coal Co. v. Lawrence, 176 Ind. 469, 95 N.E. 423 (1911).
The compensatory nature of the acts actually was weakened by the introduction of the
contributory negligence defense. See Foster, Statutory Strict Liability, 39 A.B.A.J.
1015 (1958) ; 2 RESTATEMENT, TORTS, § 286, at 753 (1934).
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tion did make possible the defense of contributory negligence' 2 -a de-
fense which the legislature may not have intended. There were seventeen
cases appearing in the appellate courts under this statute and its amend-
ment.33 Thus, by 1900, largely as a result of the doubtful construction
of a locomotive signals act, there were multiple precedents in Indiana for
the negligence "per se" doctrine.
B. The factory act cases. The next major series of statutory neg-
ligence cases arose out of the famous Factory Act of 1899."' Section 9
which required the employer to undertake that "all vats, pans, saws,
planers, cogs, gearing, belting, shafting, set screws and machinery of
every description therein shall be properly guarded, . . ." was the major
battleground. Violation of the act was a misdemeanor. 5 The first and
second3" cases to reach the appellate courts under the Factory Act held
that violation of the act was negligence "per se" but in so doing both of
them relied upon a leading case3" decided under the Coal Mine Safety Act
without noting that the latter act specifically provided for a civil recovery.
The Factory Act accounted for more than half of the statutory neg-
ligence cases to reach the Indiana appellate courts in the period between
1900 and 1920. Notwithstanding lip service to the negligence per se
pattern established by the two early cases, beginning about 1905 the act
underwent a versatile attack by the Indiana courts. Three weapons were
used: (1) A strict interpretation of the act which narrowed its scope
solely to machines ordinarily encountered in the course of the employee's
duties3" and which limited the phrase "machinery of every description"
to machinery of the same class mentioned such as vats, pans, saws,
32. Pittsburg C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Terrell, 177 Ind. 447, 95 N.E. 1109 (1911);
Pittsburg C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Burton, 139 Ind. 357, 37 N.E. 150 (1894); Cincinnati
W. & M. Ry. v. Hiltzhauer, 99 Ind. 486 (1884).
33. The Act was amended by Ind. Acts 1881 (spec. sess.) Ch. 85, at 590, Ind. Ann.
Stat. § 55-1243 (Burns 1951). Actually between 1882 and 1902, 56% of the cases in
the Indiana appellate courts involved this statute and 87% of the cases in the Indiana
appellate courts involved railways. Steam and electricity continued to be the major
tort litigation producers until the Factory Act took over in 1902.
34. § 40-901 et seq. Ind Ann Stat. (Burns' 1952). In 1860 there were 21,295 work-
ers in industrial pursuits in Indiana. By 1900 there were 155,956. During the same
period the value of manufactured goods multiplied almost 9 times. Among the principal
industries were lumber manufacture and heavy industry. The age of wood was rapidly
coming to an end. 2 BARNHART & CARALONY op. cit. supra n. 2 at 226-52. By 1920 the
two leading industries were steel and motor vehicles. Id. at 440. Mechanization of the
manufacturing process was marked after 1900. Id. at 443. By 1947 in Indiana the value
added by the manufacturing process to raw materials was over three times as much as
the value of all agricultural products. Id. at 544.
35. § 40-1017 Ind. Ann. Stat. (Burns' 1952).
36. Buehner Chair Co. v. Feulner, 28 Ind. App. 479, 63 N.E. 239 (1902) ; Monteith
v. Kokomo Wood Enameling Co., 159 Ind. 149, 64 N.E. 610 (1902).
37. Davis Coal Co. v. Polland, 158 Ind. 607, 62 N.E. 492 (1902).
38. E.g., Robertson v. Ford, 164 Ind. 538, 74 N.E. 1 (1905).
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planers, cogs etc.;" (2) manipulation of proximate cause, sometimes
ridiculously limiting the employer's liability,4 and (3) application of
foresight of harm as the criterion of "properly" guarded machinery."'
For the purpose of symmetry one would like to conclude that this
changed judicial attitude toward Factory Act violations during the first
decade of this century was typically cyclical: a general relaxation from
initial zeal in enforcing new social legislation. Unfortunately there is
not sufficient evidence to support this conclusion. Whatever may have
been the actual reason for the lack of consistency in the Indiana decisions
it may or may not be significant that contemporary American authorities
were about evenly split between two alternatives: (1) violation was neg-
ligence per se and (2) violation was only evidence of negligence."
In any event, from this assault the act emerged bruised and scarcely
breathing-but alive. Apparently this is one of those instances wherein
the judicial attitude had not, for a short time, reckoned with the economic
and social pressures afoot. The great increase in numbers of factory
workers and the shift from processing lumber and farm products to
heavy industry43 sharpened the need for safe working conditions and
compensation for industrial accidents. These needs were not only re-
flected in the legislation 4 of the following years but also in the judicial
remorse vis-A-vis the Factory Act. The Workmen's Compensation Act
was about to take over as the employee's best friend, but nevertheless, the
Factory Act was nursed back to vigorous health by the courts"' just in
39. Bemis Indianapolis Bag Co. v. Krentler, 167 Ind. 653, 79 N.E. 974 (1907) ; La-
porte Carriage Co. v. Sullender, 165 Ind. 290, 75 N.E. 277 (1905). Apparently Indiana
was impressed by the New York interpretation of a like act. See Glens Falls Portland
Cement Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 162 N.Y. 399, 56 N.E. 897 (1900).
40. This was particularly apparent in the Supreme Court. Two examples are
Crawford & McCrimmon v. Gose, 172 Ind. 81, 87 N.E. 711 (1909), (plaintiff's hand
slipped and was caught in machinery cogs) and; P.H. & F.M. Roots Co. v. Meeker, 165
Ind. 132, 73 N.E. 253 (1905), (plaintiff slipped on a loose rod left on the floor and
fell into machinery cogs). In both cases the court said the proximate cause of the in-jury was the slip and not defendant's failure to guard the cogs. Compare Cook v. Orms-
by, 45 Ind. App. 352, 89 N.E. 525 (1909).
41. Vigo Cooperage Co. v. Kennedy, 42 Ind. App. 433, 85 N.E. 986 (1908) ; Grace
v. Globe Stove & Range Co., 40 Ind. App. 326, 82 N.E. 99 (1907). See Robbins v. Ft.
Wayne Iron & Steel Co., 41 Ind. App. 557, 84 N.E. 514 (1908).
42. SHEARISAN & REDFIELD, NEGLIGENCE, § 13 (5th ed. 1898) ; 2 JAGGARD, TORTS §
263 (1895). Compare 1 TH ompsoN, NEGLIGFNCE §§ 10, 11 (1901).
43. Supra n. 34.
44. Workmen's Compensation Act, Ind. Acts 1915, Ch. 106, at 392; Commission for
Workmen's Compensation, Ind. Acts 1913, Ch. 333, at 897; Second Employer's Liability
Act, Ind. Acts 1911, § 40-1101 et seq. Ind. Ann. Stat (Burns 1952).
45. In Cincinnati H. & D. Ry. v. Armuth, 180 Ind. 673, 103 N.E. 738 (1913), the
supreme court criticized the Meeker, supra note 40, and Sullender, supra note 39, cases
but over-compensated with some unnecessarily loose cause talk: "That the accident
could not have happened without the offending cause is sufficient to constitute it the
proximate cause." 180 Ind. at 678, 103 N.E. at 740. In Illinois Car Co. v. Brown, 67
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time to sicken with creeping obsolence.46
Moreover, the cozening attitude toward the negligence per se doc-
trine apparent in the later cases under the Factory Act probably reflected
the general trend in statutory negligence cases. In 1914, Professor
Thayer, whose widely read discussion of the problem has been previously
mentioned, wrote, "to invite the jury to consider when and to what ex-
tent it is reasonable to break the law is a strange thing."47
C. The steam and electric railway cases. Prior to the turn of the
century there had been several Indiana negligence cases involving steam
railways but which did not involve the crossing signal acts. For the most
part they concerned city ordinances and uniformly held breach of a crimi-
nal regulation to be negligence per se.48 By 1900 the steam railway had
become by far the principle means of transportation in Indiana49 and in
the early 1900's Indiana had a more extensive system of electric railways
than any other state.55 Inevitably the increased mileage, speed and ef-
ficiency had its counterpart in accident litigation. Except for what ap-
pears to be an occasional aberration5' there was little indication of any
desire to restrict the liability of the railways whether the violation was
of a statute, ordinance or administrative regulation. 2 Consistently with
Ind. App. 315, 116 N.E. 4 (1917) the court criticized the previous application of ejusdem
generis to "machinery of every kind" and said the act applied to all machinery if found
to be dangerous. In Indiana Manufacturing Co. v. Coughlin, 65 Ind. App. 268, 115 N.E.
260 (1917) the act was said to apply to a machine whether or not used in the usual dis-
charge of the employee's duties if his work required him to come near it. In Kokomo
Steel & Wire Co. v. Carson, 69 Ind. App. 523, 119 N.E. 224 (1918), foresight of injury
as the boundary of the employer's duty to properly guard machinery was dealt a mortal
blow.
46. Over 20 years later, a brief revival permitted recovery for two otherwise un-
compensated occupational diseases. Dalton Foundaries v. Jeffries, 114 Ind. App. 271,
51 N.E.2d 13 (1943); Dean v. Dalton Foundaries, 109 Ind. App. 377, 34 N.E.2d 145
(1941). If the factory act is dead there has been no burial. / It remains on the books.
47. Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARv. L. REv. 317, 323 (1914).
Harper and James suggest that the strict rule was ascendant nationwide during this
period. 2 HARPER & JAmEs, TORTs 1013 (1956).
48. Pittsburg C.C. & St. L. Ry. v. Moore, 152 Ind. 345, 53 N.E. 290 (1899) ; Penn-
sylvania Co. v. Horton, 132 Ind. 189, 31 N.E. 45 (1892) ; Indiana B. & W. Ry. v. Barn-
hart, 115 Ind. 399, 16 N.E. 121 (1888); Pennsylvania Co. v. Stegemeier, Adm'rx., 118
Ind. 305, 20 N.E. 843 (1888) ; Shirk v. Wabash R. R., 14 Ind. App. 126, 42 N.E. 656(1895).
49. In 1900 there were 6,471 miles of steam railway in Indiana. This is roughly
equivalent to the 1950 mileage. The peak was in the 1910-1920 decade at about 7,425
miles. 2 BARNHART & CARmONy op. cit. supra note 2 at 457.
50. Blackburn, Interurban Railroads of Indiana, 20 IND. MAG. HIsT. 221, 400
(1924). Now only one remains; the South Shore Line from South Bend to Chicago.
2 BARNHART & CARMONY, op. cit. supra n. 2 at 463. In cities electrical street railways
first appeared in the late 1880's. Id. at 266.
51. E.g., Cleveland C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Mann, 76 Ind. App. 518, 132 N.E. 646
(1921); Conder v. Griffith, 61 Ind. App. 218, 111 N.E. 816 (1916).
52. Municipal Ordinances: Public Utilities Co. v. Handorf, 185 Ind. 254, 112
N.E. 755 (1916); New York & St. L. Ry. v. Lind, 180 Ind. 38, 102 N.E. 449 (1913).
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
the earlier pattern, negligence as a matter of law was the order of the
day. The high point of this litigation appears to be in the decade 1910
to 1920, roughly corresponding with the heyday of the railways. There
is no real indication that the courts intended any occupational variations
of the strict negligence per se rule. During this period the statutory
negligence rule as applied in the railway cases was consistent with the
rule applied to the two previous categories.
D. The motor vehicle cases. The first statutory negligence case in-
volving the automobile appeared in the Indiana Supreme Court in 1912.3
The pattern had now become familiar. The basis of the charge of neg-
ligence was a breach of the speed law."4 Before 1912 the automobile was
a thunderous, erratic contraption and the star of negligence per se was
ascendant. It is no wonder then that the court without hesitation applied
the older authorities" and pronounced the violation negligence as a mat-
ter of law. Beginning about 1915 the motor vehicle litigation developed
apace. 6 As in other areas of statutory responsibility, except for insig-
nificant deviations," the earlier authorities were consistently severe. But
after 1940 the deviations from the strict rule of negligence as a matter
of law became more frequent and by 1955 it became apparent that the
negligence per se doctrine, with respect to rules of the road at least, could
no longer be said to be the Indiana rule. 8
One of the early cases, Condor v. Griffith,"9 had long troubled the
Indiana courts because defendants relied upon it frequently. In that case
See Chicago & E. R. R. v. Lawrence, 169 Ind. 319, 79 N.E. 363 (1906). Administra-
tive Regulations: Van Osdol v. Henderson, Adm'r., 216 Ind. 240, 22 N.E.2d 812 (1939) ;
Hille v. Chicago, I. R. R., 188 Ind. 130, 122 N.E. 321 (1919). Compare, Town of Kirk-
lin v. Everman, 217 Ind. 683, 28 N.E.2d 73, modified on rehearing, 29 N.E.2d 206
(1940). In later years particularly since 1930, the overwhelming number of cases have
involved statutes.
53. Fox v. Barekman, 178 Ind. 572, 99 N.E. 989 (1912).
54. Ind. Acts 1905, Ch. 123, § 2 at 202, as amended, Ind. Acts 1907, Ch. 258, § 1 at
558. This was the first state speed law applicable to motor vehicles.
55. Specifically, Pennsylvania Co. v. Hensil, 70 Ind. 569 (1880), (the Indiana
genesis of negligence per se) and other railroad and factory act cases, one of which,
Inland Steel Co. v. Yedinak, 172 Ind. 423, 87 N.E. 229 (1909), was a child labor case.
56. The first motor vehicle registration statute was at Ind. Acts 1913, Ch. 300, at
779. The following year there were 66,410 passenger cars registered in Indiana. 2
BARmHART & CARMONY op. cit. supra n. 2 at 472. In 1957 there were 1,563,713 passenger
cars and 296,810 trucks.
57. Typical were: Hamilton Harris Co. v. Larrimer, 183 Ind. 429, 432, 105 N.E.
43, 44 (1915). "iT]he willful or n-egligent violation of a city ordinance was negligence
per se," (emphasis supplied) and Gerlot v. Swartz, 212 Ind. 292, 7 N.E. 960 (1937) in
which the court suggested there could be some excuse for not having statutory flares
marking a truck parked upon the highway.
58. Of the 18 Indiana cases since 1940, exactly one-half said there could be an ex-
cuse civilly for violation of the motor vehicle statutes. Since 1950 excuse was permitted
in two-thirds of the motor vehicle violations.
59. 61 Ind. App. 218, 111 N.E. 816 (1916).
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the appellate court admitted that it found no authority for but favored
the allowance of an excuse for a technical violation of an ordinance re-
quiring riders and drivers to keep "as nearly as practicable"6 to the right
side of the street. Condor received little support until thirty years later
in a case"1 involving a statute requiring adequate brakes. The Appellate
Court, by dictum, approved the Condor rule and further stated the Su-
preme Court likewise approved it." This position, while not specifically
defined by the courts, treated the violation as presumptive rather than
conclusive of negligence.62 Four years later the Supreme Court again
applied the "excuse" rule to a parking violation 4 but suggested that the
statutes mandating certain motor vehicle equipment such as adequate
brakes, lights, etc., were "absolute" duties.6 5 Violation of an "absolute"
duty was said to be negligence as a matter of law. This suggestion that
rules of the road are flexible and equipment rules inflexible has not been
pursued in later cases. A late decision of the Appellate Court" indicates
that the "excuse" or "prima facie negligence" exception has devoured
the negligence per se rule in motor vehicle cases and that impression is
fortified by a recent Supreme Court opinion."7 But in the latter case the
court added: "It should be borne in mind, of course, that some of the
statutes define duties which are positive and which remain the same
under all circumstances, the breach of which are not excusable in any
60. Thus the ordinance carried a built in defense. The court did not, however, rely
entirely upon the words "as nearly as practicable." The case is distinguished in Union
Traction Co. v. Wynkoop, 90 Ind. App. 331, 154 N.E. 40 (1926) (violation of a speed
ordinance) on that basis. Other examples of built in excuses are: Indianapolis St. Ry.
v. Slifer, 35 Ind. App. 700, 74 N.E. 19 (1905), involving the same ordinance, in which
the court said whether it was practicable to keep to the right was a question of fact for
the jury; statutes making excessive speeds "prima facie unreasonable" as in Buchanan v.
Horris, 198 Ind. 79, 151 N.E. 385 (1926) ; and the Factory Act with its language "prop-
erly guarded."
61. Rentschler v. Hall, 117 Ind. App. 255, 69 N.E.2d 619 (1946).
62. Jones v. Cary, 219 Ind. 268, 37 N.E.2d 944 (1941). The statute required
drivers to yeild one-half of the right-of-way on passing oncoming vehicles. The lan-
guage of the case is not clear but it does seem a tentative step away from negligence
per se.
63. Jones v. Cary, supra n. 62 at 284.
64. Northern Indiana Transit, Inc. v. Burk, 228 Ind. 162, 89 N.E.2d 905 (1905).
65. See supra, n. 16.
66. Thompson v. Ashba, 122 Ind. App. 58, 102 N.E.2d 519 (1951).
67. Larkins v. Kohlmeyer, 229 Ind. 391, 98 N.E.2d 896 (1951), unless emphasis
which is not suggested by the court is to be placed on the word "operation" in the de-
cision, in order to limit it to "operating" offenses. The court said:
"Thus it may be said that where one has violated the provisions of a statute or
ordinance in the operation of an automobile on a public highway, he is guilty of
negligence as a matter of law unless the evidence discloses that compliance
was impossible or non-compliance was excusable because of circumstances re-
sulting from causes or things beyond his control, and in no way produ6ed by
his own negligence, or his conduct comes within an excuse or exception spe-
cifically provided in the statute itself." Id. at 400, 98 N.E.2d at 900.
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case. We are; not here concerned with any such."" Nor is it made clear
what the "positive" duties are.
Any attempt to synthesize the later Indiana cases into a rational
theory which will distinguish safety regulations whose violation may be
civilly ."excusable" from others which impose an "absolute duty" is fu-
tile. Actually there are hardly enough decided cases of the "prima facie"
negligence type to justify any conclusion at this time. To date neither
economic protection for a certain social group or against certain hazards,
nor likelihood of injury from violation of the statute appear as reasons
for maintaining a difference between negligence per se and "prima facie"
negligence. The explanation probably lies in a change in attitude rather
than in the subject of regulation.69 Furthermore, one wonders in how
many cases the courts have talked in terms of negligence per se simply
because no excuse for the violation was offered or one would have been
preposterous in the circumstances.
III. RATIONALE
A. Fault and statutory negligence.
It is a tenable assumption that the function in a free society of the
law of torts and of criminal law is the promotion of security :71 "deter-
rent" security in the case of criminal law wherein the ultimate goal is the
prevention of socially dangerous conduct"1 and "compensatory" security
in the case of expanding tort law, wherein the ultimate goal is the assur-
ance of compensation for recognizable injuries."2 As Dean Pound has
suggested, the difficulty with the compensation goal is the stopping
place.7 If everyone is compensated for every injury or conversely, if
every actor is required to compensate for any injury he causes the result
is an almost stagnating burden upon enterprise. Or so it is thought.
Thus, tort law has evolved several methods of limiting liability for in-
juries caused. Losses are not shifted "willy-nilly" from the injured to
the actor, but pursuant to a factor which will approximately equalize the
competing social pressures for compensation and for freedom to act."'
68. Id. at 401, 98 N.E2d at 900.
69. 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS, 1013 (1956).
70. 1 AUSTIN, JURISPRUDENcE 278 (1875) ; VON IHERING, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN
END 362, 363 (1924) ; Pound, Causatioin, 67 YALE L. J. 1, 4 (1957).
71. See Sauer v. U.S., 241 F.2d 640, 649 (9th Cir. 1957) ; CALDWELL, CRIMINOLOGY
115 (1956); HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 200 (1947); SALMOND,
TORTS 21 (11th ed. 1953) ; Pound, The Future of the Criminal Law, 21 COL. L. REv. 1,
3 (1921).
72. SEA EY, COGITATIONS ON TORTS 6 (1954). Mueller, Book Review, 46 J. CRIM.
L., C. & P. S. 376 (1955).
73. Pound, Causation, 67 YALE L. J. 1, 2 (1957).
74. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 49, 50 (1881) ; MORRIS, TORTS 9 (1953) ; Pound,
op. cit. supra n. 72.
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In negligence cases the factor has by definition been lack of reasonable
care-fault, if that term is preferred. Only in the event the actor is at
fault is the loss shifted to him.
Traditionally, statutory negligence has not been considered as an in-
dependent sanction but has been treated (illogically or not) as a species
of negligence wherein the standard of care is either fixed or suggested by
a criminal enactment. If the traditional classification is correct it fol-
lows that the loss shifting factor in statutory negligence cases is the
same as in all other negligence cases-lack of due care. Unless one as-
sumes the state of perfection in which no reasonable man ever violates
the law, breach of a criminal statute will not inevitably be imprudent con-
duct. Ultimately then, whether a breach of a criminal statute auto-
matically produces civil liability or is only more or less persuasive of li-
ability depends upon abandonment of or adherence to the due care (or
fault) principle."M For example, Driver in his new car tested the brakes
in the dealer's garage. On leaving the garage he attempted to apply the
brakes at the first stop signal; they failed to operate and he crashed into
Victim, a pedestrian, who was in the proper crossing and walking with
the traffic light. Driver drove with inadequate brakes. In so doing
he violated the motor vehicle code. Assuming that he exercised reason-
able care throughout shall he be civilly responsible to Victim because of
the breach of the safety regulation? If he is, is this negligence? The
unalterable imposition of responsibility because of a criminal misde-
meanor-the disallowance of any explanation or excuse for the breach-
is inconsistent with the basic principle of negligence."' It is something
less than negligence. On the other hand, the strict doctrine (negligence
per se) is an appealing doctrine for the bench because it provides some
measure of certainty in an area of imponderables and for the bar because
it affords a greater measure of predictability of outcome. And, argu-
ably, it is no sufficient indictment of the negligence per se rule merely to
say that it fails to fit neatly into the negligence pattern.
Nevertheless, a conclusion of civil liability should not be compelled
by the existence of the criminal statute. As a penal regulation the statute
75. See Morris, Criminal Statutes & Tort Liability, 46 HARv. L. IEv. 453 (1933).
Of course there are areas in tort law wherein vestigially or functionally no fault is re-
quired. But note that these areas usually involve circumstances in which the fault prin-
ciple has not produced satisfactory results. For example, many suggest the fault prin-
ciple is unsuited to the millions of motor vehicle accidents. Conceding that to be true
arguendo, abandonment of the fault principle should apply to all auto accident cases and
not just those involving safety regulations.
76. The rationale proposed by Thayer is that a reasonably prudent man does not
break a criminal law and therefore one who does is negligent. See Thayer, Public Wrong
and Private Action, 27 HAI v. L. Ray. 317, 322 (1914). Compare Lowndes, Civil Liabil-
ity Created by Criminal Legislation, 16 MINN. L. REv. 361 (1932).
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creates a minimal standard of individual conduct for the benefit of the
group. Criminal responsibility under it may not be dependent upon moral
dereliction for two practical reasons:
(1) If the safety regulation is to achieve a maximum deterrent
security, certainty of convictions for violations is as important as the
penalty. Certainty of conviction, of course, decreases in direct propor-
tion to the increase in permissible excuses for violation. Hence, no ex-
cuses are allowed.
(2) Practical judicial administration militates against excusing
violations of safety regulations of a minor nature, involving little if any
immorality but time consuming and expensive if defendant's moral fault
must be tried in even a small proportion of the great number of cases.
Thus, strict statutory criminal responsibility is a tool for social con-
trol."' But when the same statute is used as a strict measure of indi-
vidual tort liability it is something like using a yardstick to measure a
pint of spaghetti simply because the yardstick happens to be handy.
Furthermore, the arguments for a quick and inexpensive determination
of responsibility are not as strong in civil cases: For one thing, civil in-
jury does not always follow violation of the speed regulation and for an-
other, if injury does follow the resultant damages are frequently any-
thing but trivial. Determination of whether the loss should be shifted is
of tremendous importance to the interested parties in this situation. In
short, there is no greater policy reason for the elimination of the fault
principle in statutory negligence cases than there is in any negligence case.
As previously noted the Indiana cases have offered no satisfactory
explanation of the negligence per se rule. The very lack of an articulate
rationale for the negligence per se doctrine as opposed to the "prima
facie" doctrine suggests the former may have been a procedural device
to facilitate case solution. Further, a latent dissatisfaction with it as a
rule of thumb has begun to appear. Perhaps the rationale for which
Indiana courts and others are searching is simply this: As a statute
becomes more clearly a mandate to deliberate, plan or prepare for the
safety of others, an excuse for its violation becomes inherently more dif-
ficult to prove. It would be very difficult, for example, to establish an
excuse for failure to have a required fire escape upon a theatre. Like-
wise it is improbable that excuses for operating a motor vehicle with
dangerously worn tires could be produced. Inevitably as more safety
preparation is mandated excuse will become more difficult and even im-
77. On the general subject see Morrisette v. U.S., 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952) ; HALL,
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw 279 (19.47); PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAWv 692(1957); MODEL CRIMINAL CODE, § 1.05, Comment (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1954).
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possible. This is nothing new-it is only the counterpart of the phrase
"under the circumstances" in non-statutory negligence cases. It is the
problem of the fact finder to determine whether an adequate excuse con-
sistent with the standard of a reasonably prudent man under the circum-
stances has been shown. In short, the rule is constant-only the circum-
stances change its application and one of the circumstances is the inherent
difficulty or ease of showing an excuse for violation of varying safety
regulations. For this result it is not necessary to apply a negligence per
se rule in one case and the "prima facie" rule in another. The latter
could serve in all.
There is no evidence that the application of the rule of negligence
per se for violation of safety regulations is intended as a transitional
doctrine on the way to strict civil liability. If it were, it would be a
pretty haphazard strict liability lacking consistency and independent of
any rational basis therefor such as ultra-hazardous conduct or ability to
absorb a financial loss. Rather it is suggested, the doctrine of negligence
per se at least modernly, is a case-solving device.
B. Presumptive of Fault. Before attempting a final appraisal of
statutory negligence or the trend of the Indiana cases, it would be desir-
able to transfix two slippery terms. They are "prima facie" and "pre-
sumption." The other pertinent term, "negligence per se" has already
been fairly well immobilized."'
Exact definition of "prima facie" out of context is difficult. It is
capable of at least two meanings: (1) It may be used in the sense that
plaintiff7 has merely satisfied his obligation of producing enough proof
to entitle him to jury consideration. The jury may decide for or against
him but a verdict cannot be directed against him at that point. (2) It
may be used in the sense of a rebuttable (sometimes called mandatory)
presumption. Ideally "prima facie" achieves more certainty when it sheds
any connotation of presumption and is employed only in the first mean-
ing. The Indiana use of the term has not been perfectly consistent.
"Prima facie" has on occasion been defined as here suggested; i.e., not
binding upon the jury.8" More often, however, it has been considered in
Indiana as a rebuttable presumption which shifts to the other party the
78. Rentschler v. Hall, 117 Ind. App. 255, 69 N.E.2d 619 (1946).
79. Plaintiff is used herein as the beneficiary of the presumption because most of-
ten he is. But if the issue is statutory contributory negligence, the defendant will be the
beneficiary.
80. Huffman v. State, 205 Ind. 75, 80, 185 N.E. 131, 134 (1933) ; Landreth v. State,
201 Ind. 691, 702, 171 N.E. 192, 196 (1930); Blough v. Parry, 144 Ind. 463, 494, 43 N.E.
560, 563 (1895).
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burden of going forward with the evidence.8' Specifically, in the statu-
tory negligence cases, while the Indiana courts have ordinarily used the
language "prima facie evidence of negligence"82 it is clear they have in-
tended the phrase in its rebuttable presumption connotation.8"
Returning now to the qualitative effect of the violation of a safety
regulation in a civil case it is well to note again that for criminal law
administrative purposes the defendant will norimially be precluded from
arguing that through no fault of his there were circumstances which pre-
vented his compliance with the regulation.8" In this context, i.e., for
criminal law purposes, the varying circumstances of each case must be
ignored. This may be the crux of the matter. The regulation does not
purport to establish what a reasonable man would do in the particular
circumstances of a given case but establishes for penal regulatory pur-
poses the least anyone should always do. So while this legislative mini-
mum is conclusive criminally it need not be conclusive of liability or im-
munity in a civil case because a reasonable man might do more or less
in the circumstances.8" Nevertheless, it should not be ignored completely
in a civil case. As a minimal standard it is persuasive of fault but how
persuasive remains to be explored. Conceivably, if negligence per se
were excluded the violation of a safety regulation could produce one of
four alternatives in a civil case:
1. It could be relevant evidence admissable on the issue of neg-
ligence.
2. It could give the plaintiff a prima facie case in the lesser sense;
i.e., plaintiff has produced enough evidence of neglivence to entitle him
81. Ragsdale v. Robinson, 219 Ind. 335, 341, 38 N.E.2d 570, 572 (1942) ; Jones v.
Cary, 219 Ind. 268, 284, 37 N.E.2d 944, 951 (1941) ; Meek v. Julian, 219 Ind. 83, 85, 36
N.E.2d 854, 855 (1941) ; Kilgore v. Gannon, 185 Ind. 682, 114 N.E. 446 (1916) ; Gandy
v. Orr, 112 Ind. App. 605, 611, 44 N.E.2d 181, 183 (1942) ; Fuzy v. Department of Fi-
nancial Institutions, 109 Ind. App. 601, 611, 37 N.E.2d 24, 28 (1941).
82. Larkins v. Kohlmeyer, 229 Ind. 391, 400, 98 N.E.2d 896, 900 (1951) ; Northern
Ind. Transit Co. v. Burk, 228 Ind. 162, 173, 89 N.E.2d 905, 910 (1950); Thompson v.
Ashba, 122 Ind. App. 58, 102 N.E.2d 519 (1951).
83. "The duty of coming forward with the evidence to sustain such a defense is
upon the operator of the vehicle." Larkins v. Kohlmeyer, supra n. 82 at 400; Tate v.
West, 120 Ind. App. 519, 94 N.E.2d 371 (1950) ; "[T]he operator may be excused from
compliance with this section, but the duty of coming forward with the evidence to show
such excuse is upon him." Northern Indiana Transit Co. v. Burk, supra n. 82 at 173;
"[T]he violation of such statute or ordinance is prima facie negligence per se," Condor
v. Griffith, 61 Ind. App. 218, 224, 111 N.E. 816, 818 (1916). See also, Hancock Truck
Lines, Inc. v. Butcher, 229 Ind. 36, 94 N.E.2d 537 (1950) ; Jones v. Cary, supra n. 81.
84. The extent to which insanity, infancy, coercion and necessity are defenses to a
criminal charge of this nature remains largely unexplored. Sayre, Public Welfare Of-
feinses, 33 CoLum. L. Rav. 55, 75 (1933).
85. If the statutory standard is minimal it would follow that its violation is not
per se conclusive of negligence nor is its observance per se conclusive of due care. See
3 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 1014 (1956); PROSSER, TORTS 163 (2d ed. 1955); Morris,
Criminal Statutes and Negligence, 49 CoLumn. L. Rav. 21, 23, 42 (1949).
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to jury consideration if the evidence is uncontested. The jury may or
may not agree that negligence has been shown. This is sometimes de-
scribed as a permissible inference.
3. It could raise a rebuttable presumption of negligence which
could compel a verdict for plaintiff unless a reasonable excuse is offered
by defendant.
4. It could shift the burden of proving a reasonable excuse to the
defendant.
It is submitted that of these alternatives the third (rebuttable pre-
sumption of negligence) offers the most desirable choice; it affords
recognition of the legislative judgment and still makes the determination
of negligence dependent upon the circumstances of each case. One who
fails to comply with a minimal standard of safety should incur the obli-
gation of showing circumstances which excuse his noncompliance and
neither the first nor the second alternatives (evidence and inference) im-
pose such an obligation.86 Furthermore, circumstances excusing compli-
ance with a minimal standard will be out of the ordinary. There is no
injustice in a rebuttable presumption of normalcy. 7
A slavish regard for the traditional in assigning the burden of proof
to one party or another should not alone preclude the fourth possibility
(shift in burden of proof). However, the circumstances which the de-
fendant will wish to establish in order to excuse his non-compliance are
not in the nature of an affirmative defense like confession and avoidance.
The ultimate issue is not the breach of the regulation but negligence.
What defendant is saying is, "In spite of the breach of the regulation I
was not negligent." Thus his evidence of the circumstances is relevant
to a denial of the issue raised by plaintiff's assertion of negligence.
Stronger reasons of policy than here appear should be advanced before
the traditional burden of persuasion is shifted on this the most important
issue in most damage suits.8 8
Without wishing to labor the point, the Indiana statutory negli-
gence cases decided within the last decade exhibit a clear trend toward
re-assimilation of statutory negligence into the negligence complex-to-
ward a rule which makes the breach of a statute presumptive but not con-
clusive of negligence. Whatever terminology is from time to time em-
ployed in all of the later deviations from the negligence per se formula
86. See MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 308 (1954); MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE (Morgan
Forward) 56; 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2491 (3rd ed. 1040).
87. See MCCORMICK, op. cit. supra n. 85 § 309, THAYER, A PRELIMINAR1Y TREATISE
ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 326, 340 (1898) ; Morgan, Some Observations Con-
cerning Presumptions, 44 HARv. L. REv. 906, 930 (1931).
88. But compare, Morgan, Presumptions, 12 WASH. L. REV. 255, 281 (1937).
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the breach of a safety regulation has actually raised a rebuttable pre-
sumption of negligence.
IV. PROCEDURAL CONSEQUENCES
A. Effect of a Rebuttable Presumption of Negligence. Reluctantly,
the obvious must again be stated that if "presumption" ever was a precise
legal term it has long since ceased to have significance as such. But it
would serve no useful purpose in this connection to plow under the pre-
sumption patch."9 The term is so deeply ingrained in the legal literature
it would now be difficult to abandon. It would seem preferable to ac-
cept the term, to isolate its meaning in negligence cases and ruthlessly
to prune any extraneous connotations."0
As generally characterized "presumption" describes a factual rela-
tionship--when a basic fact is known to exist another fact must be as-
sumed."' Normally these are known as presumptions of law but some-
times may be described as presumptions of fact. There are many and
varied reasons for a legally recognized connection between two facts and
consequently "myriads" of types of presumptions. The most common
species is the presumption based upon probabilities; i.e., once the basic
fact (e.g., violation of a safety regulation) is established it is rationally
probable the presumed fact (negligence) is true.92 If the original analy-
sis herein is correct that a legislative safety regulation establishes a mini-
mal standard of care, the presumption of negligence from its violation is
a rational one of probabilities. For example, one who fails to put out
flares around a truck stalled on the travelled portion of the highway
probably has not exercised the care of a reasonably prudent man. The
assumption from statutory violation to negligence is one entirely consis-
tent with human experience.
89. See McCORMICK, op. cit. supra n. 86 § 308; 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2491;
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE (Morgan Forward) 52, 54, 306 (1942); McCormick, Charges
on Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 5 N.C.L. REv. 291 (1927); McBaine, Burden of
Proof; Presumptions, 2 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 13 (1954); Morgan, Some Observations Con-
cerning Presumptions, 44 HARv. L. REV. 906 (1931) ; Morgan, Instructing the fury upon
Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 47 HAgv. L. REV. 59 (1933).
90. It has been suggested by many courts and almost all writers agree that it is
possible to attribute one fixed meaning to "presumption" which will control its applica-
bility and effect. Unfortunately they are not agreed upon the one meaning. See MODEL
CODE OF EVIDENCE (Morgan Forward) 55 (1942); McBaine, op. cit. supra note 88;
"[T]he numberless propositions figuring in our cases under the name of presumptions,
are quite too heterogeneous and non-comparable in kind, and quite too loosely conceived
of and expressed, to be used or reasoned about without some circumspection," THAYER,
op. cit. supra note 87, 351.
91. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 701, p. 312 (1942) ; authorities cited supra note
89.
92. The presumption device also has meaning in many jurisdictions where the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable and for the same reason.
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There are two major theories of the procedural effect of this type
of presumption :93
1. If the basic fact has been established (in this case, the statutory
violation) the presumption of negligence arising therefrom, if uncontro-
verted, is enough to carry the one alleging negligence safely past a motion
for involuntary non suit or motion for directed verdict. Undisputed, it
requires a finding of negligence. But if evidence appears from whatever
source and at whatever point in the trial which would justify a jury in
finding the presumed fact (negligence) did not exist, like a genii the pre-
sumption vanishes and the case proceeds as if it had never existed.
Thus under this, the Thayer type presumption,94 the effect is to place
upon the opponent of the presumption (the defendant in most negligence
cases) the "risk of non production" of evidence. Since, on the appear-
ance of countervailing evidence, the presumption could disappear during
the plaintiff's case, theoretically the unwonted departure could leave the
plaintiff without sufficient evidence to go to the jury.9 So the Thay-
erian effect gives the beneficiary of a presumption no unconditional
guarantee against a nonsuit or directed verdict.9"
2. Other authorities, notably Morgan and McGuire,"7 favor a
93. A third, less frequently encountered, theory treats the presumption as evidence
in the case instead of a rule about the effect of certain evidence. The presumption be-
comes an item of proof in the case to be weighed with all other evidence. Practically,
this appears to give proof of the basic fact, i.e., breach of a safety regulation in these
cases, a double effect: procedurally as a presumption of negligence and substantively as
proof of negligence. The latter effect requires the fact finder to perform the ridicu-
lously impossible task of adding apples and aphorisms. Almost everyone agrees that this
exercise in confusion is to be avoided. Kaiser v. Happel, 219 Ind. 28, 33, 36 N.E.2d
784, 786 (1941) ; McCoRmIcK, EvIDENCE § 317 at 669 (1954); MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE CoM-
MoIN SENSE AND CoMM o LAW 190 (1947) ; 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2491 at 290 (1940) ;
Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Presumptions, 44 HARv. L. REv. 906, 908 (1931).
94. THAYER, op. cit. supra note 87, 336. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 704, at 313
(1942).
95. Apparently the Thayer theory of dissolving presumptions obtains in Nebraska,
New Jersey and Tennessee, among other jurisdictions. In a number of eases involving
a presumption in plaintiff's favor directed verdicts for defendant were nevertheless sus-
tained: Schaeffer v. Anchor Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 133 Iowa 205, 100 N.W. 857 (1904) ;
Witthauer v. Paxton-Mitchell Co., 146 Neb. 436, 19 N.W.2d 865 (1945); Carroll v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 125 N.J.L. 397, 15 A.2d 810 (1940) ; Walters v. Staton,
21 Tenn. App. 401, 111 S.W.2d 381 (1937). In other cases where a verdict against the
beneficiary of the presumption was directed, the strength of the presumption was not
clear, e.g., Walker v. Stephens, 221 Ala. 18, 127 So. 668 (1930) ; McCullogh v. Harsh-
man, 99 Okla. 262, 226 P. 555 (1923). See Cleveland C. C. and St. L. Ry. v. Wise, 186
Ind. 316, 320, 116 N.E. 299, 301 (1917) where the court said, "This presumption (plain-
tiff's due care) does not prevail in favor of plaintiff throughout the trial except in the
absence of evidence on the subject."
96. In Indiana a motion for non-suit is not a defendant's motion. City of Ply-
mouth v. Milner, 117 Ind. 324, 20 N.E. 235 (1889). So the plaintiff would be concerned
with a possible directed verdict only.
97. Actually, Professor Morgan's presumption is even stronger. It remains in the
case until the jury finds "that the non-existence of the presumed fact is more probable
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"strong" presumption. In the face of countervailing evidence, they sug-
gest that instead of disappearing the presumption should remain in the
case until the jury finds from all the evidence produced by the parties
that due care is as probable as negligence. Stated otherwise, the opponent
of the presumption must produce at least enough evidence to place the
mind of the fact finder in equilibrium." Consequently this theory not
only places upon the defender the risk of nonproduction of evidence but
in effect secures the beneficiary of the presumption against a non suit
or directed verdict at all stages of the trial.99 Actually there is an even
stronger effect suggested by some, viz., that the presumption shifts the
burden of proof... to the defender so that he must produce enough evi-
dence to convince the fact finder that negligence is less probable than due
care.
1 0
'
Which, if any, of these possibilities obtains in Indiana? As pre-
viously observed, the Indiana courts use "presumption" and "prima facie
evidence" synonymously in statutory negligence cases.102 The procedural
effect of neither has been consistently stated. An early position seemed
to favor a "strong" presumption: "A presumption like a fact proved,
remains available to the party in whose favor it arises until overconw by
opposing evidence" (emphasis supplied)."' What appears to be a lead-
ing Indiana case,' however, pared the presumption to Thayerian dimen-
than its existence." See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE (Morgan Forward) 56, 58 (1942);
McCORMIICK, EVIDENCE § 317 at 672 (1954) ; McBaine, op. cit. supra note 88 at 22.
98. In Pennsylvania a hybrid rule on taking the case from the jury has evolved:
"While it is true that, where plaintiff's case rests upon a presumption, he is entitled to
have it submitted to the jury though rebutted by defendant's uncontradicted parol evi-
dence . . ., where the presumption is rebutted by plaintiff's own evidence, it disappears
and a nonsuit will be granted. . . ." Conley v. Mervis, 324 Pa. 577, 587, 188 A. 350, 355
(1936). This would cause plaintiff to think twice before calling defendant as his wit-
ness. If defendant's testimony, even on cross-examination, rebutted the presumption in
plaintiff's favor plaintiff might suffer a nonsuit. Compare Bender v. Welsh, 344 Pa.
392, 25 A.2d 182 (1942).
99. But see, MAGUIRRE, EVIDENCE COIMON SENSE AND CommoN LAW 190 (1947).
100. Burden of proof here, as throughout, is used in the sense of burden of per-
suasion. See McCoRaicx, EVIDENCE § 308 (1954).
101. See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE (Morgan Forward) 56 (1942).
102. See authorities szpra n. 83. See also, 9 WMoRE, EVIDENCE, § 2498A at 349.
103. Bates v. Pricket, 5 Ind. 22 (1854). See also, North v. Jones, 53 Ind. App. 203,
212, 100 N.E. 84 (1912).
104. Kilgore v. Gannon, 185 Ind. 682, 114 N.E. 446 (1916). The case was fol-
lowed in Cleveland C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wise, Adm'r., 186 Ind. 316, 116 N.E. 299
(1917) (presumption of decedent's due care) ; Van Meter v. Ritenour, Adm'r., 193 Ind.
615, 141 N.E. 329 (1923) (presumption of testator's sound mind); Minardo v. State,
204 Ind. 422, 183 N.E. 548 (1932) (statutory prima facie unreasonable speed); Kaiser
v. Happel, 219 Ind. 28, 36 N.E.2d 784 (1941) (presumption of testatrix' sanity). It ap-
pears to have been misinterpreted in Chappell v. State, 197 Ind. 272, 150 N.E. 769 (1926)
wherein the court said, "[I]t [statutory presumption from possession of alcoholic bever-
ages] is available to the party in whose favor it arises until overcome by opposing evi-
dence." Id. at 276, 150 N.E. at 770.
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sions: "It becomes of no avail as evidence to be considered by the court
or jury as soon as evidence is introduced in opposition thereto." But
what appeared to be a definite choice by the Indiana court soon lost its
certainty. The very next year, the Supreme Court molded two defini-
tions into a legal animal which chews its own tail:
The ordinary function of most so-called presumptions of law,
as they relate to the evidence, is to cast on the party against
whom the presumption works the duty of going forward with
evidence, and when that duty is performed the presumption is
functus officio, and has no proper place in the instruction to the
jury. . . . "A presumption operates to relieve the party in
whose favor it operates from going forward in argument or
evidence and serves the purpose of a prima facie case until the
other party has gone forward with his evidence, but in itself it
is not evidence, and involves no rule as to the weight of evi-
dence necessary to meet it." Elliott on Evidecne, § 91.
The weight of authority is against regarding a presump-
tion as evidence ...
A presumption, like a fact proved, remains available to the
party in whose favor it arises until overcome by opposing
evidence."'
A study of the presumption-in-action in statutory negligence cases
does not completely resolve the ambiguity. Nevertheless, on reading the
limited number of cases the impression is obtained that the Indiana
courts lean toward a "strong" presumption. The recurrent theme in
those cases is a statement that there is a duty on the party opposing the
presumption to show an excuse or produce evidence to show an excuse."'
A later expression is that the violation becomes, in effect, "nothing more
than prinia fade evidence of negligence, subject to being overcome by
proof to the contrary. . . .""' In brief, if the interpretation of the
Indiana cases be correct, the presumption of negligence arising from the
violation of a safety statute, ordinance or administrative regulation as-
sures the beneficiary of two things:
105. Cleveland C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wise, Adm'r., 186 Ind. 316, 319, 116 N.E.
299, 300 (1917).
106. Northern Indiana Transit Co. v. Burk, 228 Ind. 162, 173, 89 N.E.2d 905, 910
(1951) ; Jones v. Cary, 219 Ind. 268, 284, 37 N.E.2d 944, 951 (1941) ; Gerlot v. Swartz,
212 Ind. 292, 301, 7 N.E.2d 960, 965 (1937) ; Thompson v. Ashba, 122 Ind. App. 58, 64,
102 N.E.2d 519, 522 (1951). See Livingston v. Rice, 96 Ind. App. 176, 184 N.E. 583(1933) ; Condor v. Griffith, 61 Ind. App. 218, 111 N.E. 816 (1916). See also, 2 HARPER
& JAuES, ToRTs § 17.6 at 1009.
107. Larkins v. Kohlmeyer, 229 Ind. 391, 400, 98 N.E2d 896, 900 (1951).
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1. In any event, the beneficiary is entitled to "get to the jury."
2. Unless the opponent offers an excuse for his breach of the
safety regulation with enough proof to warrant jury consideration, the
beneficiary of the presumption is entitled to a directed verdict.
B. Instructions to the Jury. When the issue is defendant's negli-
gence and for any reason an instructed verdict is inappropriate for either
party, should the court make any mention to the jury concerning the pre-
sumption of negligence which arises from the breach of a safety regula-
tion? Of course, if the only dispute in the case concerns an unexplained
violation of a safety regulation an instruction with respect to its pro-
cedural effect is needed."' 8 In simple terms, the instruction should be
that if the jury finds that defendant did violate the safety regulation,
then they should find that defendant was negligent.
On the other hand, if the issue is whether an excuse has been pro-
duced by defendant, the instruction depends to some extent upon the
strength accorded a presumption of negligence in these cases. If the
presumption is treated as a weak or Thayerian presumption and if there
is enough evidence of excuse to warrant jury consideration of that issue,
the presumption will have disappeared by instruction time in the trial.
At the opposite pole, if the violation raises a "strong" presumption of
negligence which shifts the burden of persuasion then clearly an instruc-
tion concerning the effect of finding a statutory violation is as essential
as any other instruction upon the burden of proof. The instruction
should be that if defendant did violate the safety regulation then the
burden is upon the defendant to show by a preponderance of the evidence
that he exercised due care under the circumstances.'
If, however, it is the "strong" presumption which obtains and which
the opponent needs only to neutralize with his evidence, some mention to
the jury of the effect of the statutory violation (if found) would seem
to be desirable in any event."' While it is true some proof of the viola-
tion will be in evidence and the violation is inferential of some dereliction
on defendant's part, unless the jury is given some guidance as to its pro-
bative force the violation might well be ignored or over-emphasized. The
instruction should be that if the jury finds that the defendant violated the
safety regulation then they should find the defendant negligent unless
108. Compare the language in Cleveland C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wise, Adm'r, 186
Ind. 316, 318, 116 N.E. 299, 300 (1917) with that in Kaiser v. Happel, 219 Ind. 28, 32,
36 N.E.2d 784, 786 (1941).
108. Morgan, Instructing the Jury on Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 47 HARV.
L. REv. 59, 60, 68, (1933).
109. Morgan, op. cit. supra n. 108 at 69.
110. Morgan, op. cit. supra n. 108 at 70.
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they find from all of the evidence that it is as probable that defendant
exercised reasonable care as that he did not, in which event they should
find defendant was not negligent. 1 '
Since the Indiana cases which have employed presumptions have
used the "strong" presumption which does not shift the burden of
proof," 2 the appropriate instruction would seem to be the latter one.
Actually, although denying that the burden of proof is shifted by a pre-
sumption, in practice instructions which had that effect have been toler-
ated. For example, in Larkins v. Kohlmeyer"' the court said:
In such cases we think it would be proper to instruct the jury
that if they find from a fair preponderance of the evidence that
the defendant violated the provisions of the statute, he was
guilty of negligence, unless they further find from a fair pre-
ponderance of the evidence that compliance was impossible or
non-compliance was excusable under the rule above stated.
(emphasis supplied)
The apparent contradiction, or at least lack of precision, may be at-
tributable to the paucity of Indiana authority on presumptions in statu-
tory negligence cases. Not much experience has been acquired in dealing
with presumptions in this context. A judicial reappraisal of the language
used both in describing the effect of the presumption and in instructing
the jury would now be constructive.
CONCLUSION
A criminal statute, ordinance or administrative rule which is inter-
preted as a safety regulation for the protection of identifiable groups
from identifiable hazards undoubtedly creates on the criminal side a mini-
mal standard of care for those who engage in the designated activity.
On the civil side the legislative policy thus enunciated and the traditional
principle of no liability without negligence can both be effectuated by
treating the statutory violation as presumptive of negligence. That pre-
sumption places upon the one who has broken the safety regulation the
111. If the particular jurisdiction should require something more than a pre-
ponderance of evidence to sustain the burden of proof, use of the word "probable" may
not be accurate. Morgan, op. cit. supra n. 108 at 64.
112. North v. Jones, 53 Ind. App. 203, 212, 100 N.E. 84 (1912). See Wass v. Sut-
ler, 119 Ind. App. 655, 671, 84 N.E.2d 734, 741 (1949) for the application in res ipsa lo-
quitur cases: "[T]he burden of proof never shifts, but there are occasions when the duty
to go forward with the evidence shifts."
113. 229 Ind. 391, 401, 98 N.E.2d 896, 900 (1951). See also, Gerlot v. Swartz, 212
Ind. 292, 7 N.F_.2d 960 (1937); Livingston v. Rice, 96 Ind. App. 176, 184 N.E. 583
(1932).
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burden of procuring sufficient evidence of an excuse for the violation so
consistent with due care that due care appears as probable as negligence.
Instructions upon the effect of the presumption are desirable:
(1) To explain to the jury the effect of an admitted or proved violation
of the statute; (2) To explain to the jury the effect of the presumption
when an excuse for the violation is offered.
In Indiana the violation of a safety regulation became negligence as
a matter of law under circumstances which suggest that rule was adopted
because of its facility in solving cases rather than because of reasons of
social or legal policy. Recently some cases point to a trend to break away
from the rule and to relate statutory negligence to other established prin-
ciples of liability for negligence. It also appears in the recent cases that
breach of a safety regulation raises a rebuttable presumption of negli-
gence. The future trend and the procedural effect of this presumption
remains to be clearly defined in the cases.
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